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Britain’s predicament 
For the past four years the major industrial
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries have been in the
throes of a crisis brought to a head by the oil price
rises of 1973–4, but arising from longer run difficulties
which had already begun to appear by the late 1960s.
The crisis is by no means over. The situation of the
economically stronger countries such as the USA,
Japan and West Germany seems to be on the upturn
but the recovery of others including Britain is still very
much in doubt. With increasing oil output, Britain’s
balance of payments is rapidly improving – but this is
far from a sufficient condition for dealing with
unemployment, stagnation in key sectors, regional
imbalance, low productivity and decline or collapse in
the social services. And in any case the issues for
Britain are not simply economic, but involve also
social and political problems which recession has
sharpened: the difficulties of coming to terms with
Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalism; racial conflict;
political violence; persistent poverty; the erosion of
the welfare state; and corruption and decay in the
police and local government bureaucracies.
A time of crisis presents both dangers and
opportunities, bringing into sharp relief difficulties
which previously escaped notice, but possibly also
creating conditions in which to seek for more
fundamental solutions. The dangers are, of course,
increased if British economic policy ignores the
deeper problems (as several of our contributors
argue) and concentrates on short-run symptoms
rather than long-run causes; seeks solutions primarily
by aiming at rates of gross national product (GNP)
growth (the 5 per cent endorsed both by the NEDC
[National Economic Development Council] and
OECD) which are unrealistic in present
circumstances, beyond anything Britain has achieved
in the past and which fail to deal with the structural
causes underlying our current difficulties (Richard
Jolly); is unable to look beyond the problems and
instruments of short-run demand management
(B.S. Minhas); believes that if only we could control
the money supply or (alternatively) if only we could
make incomes policy stick our difficulties would be
over; or places too much faith in the ability of
legislation to settle difficult problems such as race
relations or regional devolution; or succumbs to the
almost millenarian faith that our troubles will be
calmed by North Sea oil.
The danger is equally one of responding too narrowly
to our international predicament. The conventional
debate between policies of free trade with deflation
or import control with expansion poses the issues far
too starkly for either analysis or prescription. This
debate largely ignores the real costs of measures
aimed at solving our difficulties in the short run but in
ways which in the long run would tend to maintain
inappropriate patterns of international specialisation
or damage the fragile economies of our Third World
neighbours: such as allowing technological advance to
proceed without any sense of long-run world
industrial balance, let alone the employment or other
human costs; or restricting imports of cheap
manufactures from the poorer countries with
adequate consideration of the opportunities for
mutual adjustment; or promoting our arms exports to
developing countries (Mary Kaldor); or imposing and
administering immigration restrictions in such a way
as to harm race relations in our own country and
damage relations with (and exports to) several
important countries in the Third World.
The relevance of development studies
It is with some trepidation that we undertake in this
issue of the IDS Bulletin to analyse some of these
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dangers and to call attention to some of the
opportunities which lie beyond them. Most of us1
lack direct experience, except in our capacity as
citizens and residents, in dealing with British
problems. Further, the direct analogy between Britain
and the developing countries is, as most of our
contributors point out, rather suspect. To be sure,
there are many similarities: structural unemployment,
inflation and balance of payments difficulties; the
emigration of professional manpower; the visiting
experts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF);
regional imbalance and the difficulty of inducing
investment and expansion. But even if we hold these
in common they indicate shared features of
underdevelopment, rather than comparable patterns
of development.
And the differences are critical. We are, after all, an
industrial country and many of our problems are
those of over-development or the wrong kind of
development, for instance: an agricultural sector that
is too small and overspecialised (Brian Johnson);
wasteful methods of energy production and use
(Barbara Ward); disease patterns created by stress,
lack of exercise and over-consumption (Michael
Lipton); and overspecialisation in highly complex
defence and aerospace technology (Mary Kaldor).
We are still (though decreasingly so) an exporter of
technology and culture, including, as Richard Batley
and Alan Rew point out, our new town housing
policy. We still have large investments abroad (Stuart
Holland) and remain the home base of several of the
larger multinational corporations, including some
operating in the Third World.2
Nevertheless we believe that the analytical
approaches of ‘development studies’ can suggest
new ways of studying Britain’s admittedly different
problems. For a variety of reasons – cogently
explained by Osvaldo Sunkel in a previous issue of the
IDS Bulletin (8.3, March 1977) – planners and social
scientists working in developing countries became
aware of the inadequacy of policies based on the
conventional methods of analysis well before the
present crisis raised doubts about them in the major
industrial countries. As both B.S. Minhas and Stuart
Holland point out below, monetary policy and
Keynesian demand management are simply not
workable in most developing countries; and the
prime emphasis of economic policy has always been
on the structure of production or supply. The
inadequacy of growth in GNP as the prime objective
of development policy with little regard for
distribution, employment, welfare and structural
change became even clearer during the period of
relatively high growth rates in the developing
countries in the 1960s. (Paradoxically, at about the
same time Britain was beginning to give more
emphasis to growth in her economic policy and
somewhat less than before to welfare and full
employment.) Moreover those in development
studies have long become used to the idea that
significant improvements may come only through
major structural change, often accompanied by acute
social conflict. And finally, the vulnerability of Third
World countries to external economic and political
pressures has made us increasingly aware of the
consequences of international dependence and of
the need for self-reliant strategies of development.
In none of these respects is a ‘development
approach’ completely new, nor is it narrowly
confined to ‘developing countries’. Indeed, as Dudley
Seers argues so persuasively, the intellectual division
of labour between development studies and other
social sciences becomes increasingly difficult to
define. But we believe that the issues have been
posed earlier and somewhat more sharply in
countries at the periphery than in the industrialised
centres of Europe and North America.
Further, those of us who argue that rapid growth
and industrialisation do not necessarily bring
development in the Third World can readily identify
parallels in the over-industrialisation of Britain, a
convergence which is brought out most clearly in the
sectoral articles by Michael Lipton, Alan Rew and
Richard Batley, Brian Johnson and Michael Allaby,
and Barbara Ward. Redistribution, alternative
cultures and lifestyles, small units of production and
consumption rather than large, decentralisation and
self-reliance; these are all themes which emerge
both in the development literature and in blueprints
for change in Britain.
One of the most troublesome aspects of developing
a conservationist, self-reliant strategy of change in
Britain is dealing with its possible implications for
trade and other transactions with the Third World.
This is considered carefully in the article by Brian
Johnson and Michael Allaby who contend that the
altered (and increased) agricultural production they
advocate in the UK would not require as much
adjustment in our trade with the developing
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countries as with our European Common Market
partners. It is less certain whether the same can be
said of the case for energy conservation persuasively
explored by Barbara Ward, which would surely have
major consequences for oil production and prices, at
least if put into effect by other industrial consumers
as well as Britain. Even developing countries which
would otherwise stand to gain by lower oil prices
might view with concern, for example, any
consequent loss in OPEC’s bargaining power vis-à-vis
the industrial countries. This is not to say, however,
that adjustment would be impossible or that the
long-run interests of both energy-consuming and
energy-producing countries may not be fairly close as
Posner argues in his review of an IDS
communications paper on North Sea Oil. Oil
producers the world over (including Britain) are
increasingly worried about the depletion of their
reserves and what happens to them ‘after oil’; for
both producers and consumers have long-run
interests in conservation, however important the
differences between them on timing and short-run
adjustment.
Neither Britain’s own development, nor that of the
developing countries can be discussed, therefore,
without taking account of Britain’s changing place in
the world economy. This is partly a matter of history.
Britain’s emergence as the major industrial and
imperial power and her subsequent decline have had
momentous consequences for the patterns of
development and underdevelopment established
both in the Third World and in Britain herself. Such
historic links continue to shape events even when, as
Michael Lipton argues in his book The Erosion of a
Relationship: India and Britain since 1960 (Lipton and
Firm, OUP 1975) – they are explicitly rejected by
both former colony and former metropolis.3 Ray
Crotty forcefully argues that Ireland’s present
problems descend directly from her relationships
with Britain in the past; and that they can only be
dealt with by major changes in the structure of Irish
society, changes which would also require the
restructuring of Ireland’s relationships with Britain.
Mary Kaldor suggests that Britain has specialised
excessively in defence and aerospace technology
both in order to maintain her status as a major
military power and to solve, by arms production and
exports, short-run difficulties in employment and the
balance of payments. This has serious costs in terms
of the diversion of resources and technological
innovation from alternative uses, in terms of our
relations with other arms-producing countries and
our participation in the arms race, and in terms of
the flow of arms to the developing countries.
To a large extent historic connections between
Britain and the Third World are being transformed
by new international influences including the
expansion and transformation of the world
economic system, the growing power and resources
of the multinational corporations, the emergence of
the socialist Bloc and the Cold War and the
increasing integration of certain leading Third World
exporters into the manufacturing structure of world
production. The problems posed in Britain are not
dissimilar to those affecting the developing countries:
the decline in our international economic bargaining
power due to our lack of competitiveness and
recurrent balance of payments difficulties, and the
problem of making the activities of multinational
corporations compatible with national economic
strategies (Stuart Holland). In some ways, however,
we are less vulnerable than the developing countries.
Foreign multinational corporations invest heavily in
the UK, Britain herself is the home base of several
multinational corporations with extensive
investments abroad (though this may not be as much
of an advantage as it looks, given that even ‘British’
multinational corporations would not find it difficult
to relocate if things became difficult for them in the
UK). We export more arms than we import. We rely
on doctors from Sri Lanka, India and other
developing countries as well as exporting them to
the USA, Canada or Australia. In other respects,
however, (especially militarily as Mary Kaldor
observes) we may depend more heavily upon our
NATO and EEC partners than developing countries
like Iran or India do upon, say, the USA or the USSR.
Although the precise nature of our international
predicament and the way we cope with it differs
from that of countries in the Third World, we have
as much to learn from them as they do from us.
From theory to practice
It is one thing to advocate – like most of the articles
in this IDS Bulletin – a less growth-oriented, more
self-reliant strategy of change in Britain. It is quite
another to put it into effect. Several of our
contributors begin by looking at the changes
necessary in one sector, but end up with a far
broader set of prescriptions which cut across a
number of different areas. Alan Rew and Richard
Batley, for example, criticise ‘welfare monism’ and
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argue that housing and welfare policy cannot be
considered separately from its interrelation with
urban growth, industrial production and
employment. Barbara Ward’s proposals for the
conservation of energy would involve changes in
transport policy, methods of agricultural production,
housing, employment and probably defence. Michael
Lipton suggests that a comprehensive strategy of
healthcare would include alterations in education,
patterns of work and leisure, sport, transport and
habits of consumption such as smoking and the fiscal
policies affecting them. All in all our contributors
make a persuasive case for comprehensive rather
than piecemeal approaches to our problems.
Nevertheless they differ in that some of them (in
particular Michael Lipton) seem to envisage changes
in one sector setting off a wave of ‘spread effects’
elsewhere; while others (like Stuart Holland) offer
more broadly based strategies for national recovery.
Anyone who has worked in development studies –
or for that matter any other policy science – is aware
of the difficulty of moving between the analysis of
problems, prescriptions for dealing with them and
back again to assessment of the conditions under
which they can (or cannot) be implemented. The
difficulties posed can be seen most sharply in relation
to the imaginary speech by a Minister of Health
which Michael Lipton uses as the vehicle for his
arguments. Under what circumstances might a
British Minister of Health actually deliver such a
speech and what response (derision or delight?)
would it get from his colleagues? How easy would it
be to buy off the vested interests he talks about?
How would one deal with the vested interests of
the medical profession? Would the combination of
incentives and alterations in legislation really bring
major changes in the structure of healthcare? How
might British politicians hoping to bring about such
radical changes win support for their views from
those whom Lipton regards as being at the
unimaginative centre of the British political
spectrum? Would a ‘non-partisan’ approach to
health – or any other major issue of social concern –
necessarily be the best way of bringing this about?
Under what circumstances could politicians develop
the vision, leadership and support to introduce such
fundamental changes in the approach to health or to
any other sector, which an alternative development
strategy involves? And what are the conditions for
such changes to be followed through in other
sectors as well? Does the present crisis create the
conditions under which the necessary political
support could be mobilised for change? How much
dissatisfaction with existing conditions –
unemployment, declining real incomes, deterioration
in social services – is needed? How could this
dissatisfaction be mobilised and what are the main
political obstacles that would be encountered?
Such questions are all the more necessary because
even our practising politicians tend to discuss their
policies mainly in terms of economic desirability
without assessing (or perhaps deliberately preferring
to ignore) their possible political repercussions. As a
former economic adviser to the government recently
put it in The Times:
All economic analysis in this field has to assume
that the Government is in a position to enforce
the policy recommended – e.g. that a monetarist
Government will remain in power however much
unemployment turns out to be needed to prevent
wage and price escalation, or than an incomes-
policy Government will be willing to face and win
a confrontation with a powerful union
determined to break the rules. Only a visionary
optimist would claim today, as you seem to be
doing about monetary policy, or as advocates of
income policy such as myself have done in the
past, that there is any likelihood of either of the
main parties being willing to face enough
unemployment, or enough confrontation, to
make it credible to the trade unions that they can
and will carry out their policy.4
Nor is it always easy to circumvent the administrative
obstacles to change. In their article on urban housing
Alan Rew and Richard Batley suggest that planning
and bureaucratic decisions have tended to
‘redistribute’ social problems – to other people, to
other agencies or to other sectors – instead of
solving them. This is typical of a situation in which
changes are mainly seen as being introduced from
the top by politicians, planners and civil servants.5
Although most of us advocate more participatory
styles of development, there is not enough discussion
in this IDS Bulletin of the way participation itself can
generate the momentum for balanced change;
except by Stuart Holland who also comes closest to
spelling out the particular British groups he thinks
are most likely to press for reform. Yet even he gives
too little attention to the conflicts from which
changes are most likely to arise, to the necessary
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process of mobilising political support and to the
methods by which genuine control over the national
economy might in practice be secured.
Any strategy for major change in British society would
also have to consider how the necessary international
adjustments could be ensured: for example the
modifications in our links with NATO implied in Mary
Kaldor’s proposals for cutting back our arms
production and military spending; or the revisions of
the Common Agricultural Policy of the European
Common Market which would permit the kind of
decentralisation and diversification of agricultural
production proposed by Brian Johnson; or the
international trade adjustments both with the
industrial countries of the OECD and with the
developing countries that would be made necessary
by structural changes in our own economy. The
adverse international pressures might be considerable
– the more so given the recent reinforcement of
international economic dependence. Yet we need not
assume that the room for international manoeuvre is
completely blocked.6 Enough dissatisfaction with the
workings of the world economy has been expressed
in recent years – to show that other countries, too,
not merely in the Third World, have recognised the
need for reform in its operations. A new assessment
is badly needed in order to distinguish the real
international constraints from those which are merely
manipulated to protect vested interests in our own
society from necessary change.
Such an assessment would also enable us to identify
possible international sources of support for our new
position, some of these, perhaps, from outside the
‘inner circle’ of the industrial OECD countries, in the
countries of the Third World whose interests on
some issues we share.
All this is to say that both social scientists and
practical planners need to give much more thought
to how fundamental changes in strategy can be
made politically and administratively feasible, in the
rich countries as much as in the Third World. Making
realistic proposals for structural change is a difficult
task in any society – not least our own. But in many
areas it is the starting point for the international
changes in which much of the advance in the poorer
countries of the Third World will depend.
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Notes
1 From this caveat we should except some our
distinguished contributors from outside IDS:
Stuart Holland, Barbara Ward, Mary Kaldor, Brian
Johnson and Michael Allaby.
2 The implications of Britain as a base for
multinational operations were explained in a
paper by Paul Kesterton and Paul Spray prepared
for a Workshop on Britain and Development at
which several of the articles in this IDS Bulletin
were discussed.
3 Lipton’s argument is that India overreacted by
cutting links with Britain even more than self-
interest alone would dictate; parallels in Britain’s
reactions to its former Empire are not hard to
find.
4 Letter from Lord Roberthall in The Times,
16 September 1977.
5 It may sometimes, however, also be typical of a
decentralised approach, in which local groups take
initiatives in solving local problems as they see
them.
6 See, for example, the discussion in IDS Bulletin 7.4
on UNCTAD IV.
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